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I.

Introduction

The due process clause protects individuals from arbitrary or unjustified
governmental intrusion in their lives.1 This does not mean citizens are completely
free from government intrusion.2 Rather, the provision guarantees to individuals
fair process when their lives, liberty, or property are at stake.3 Additionally, the
provision “provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” even when there is some form of
procedural safeguard—this is referred to as “substantive due process.”4
Substantive due process places an important limitation on state legislatures.
Unlike Congress, state legislatures are assumed to have plenary power.5 Under this
assumption, the procedural due process element only requires state legislatures to
enact laws to empower the government prior to interfering with its citizens lives as
it sees fit.6 The substantive due process element requires laws to have “a reasonable
and substantial relation to the accomplishment of some purpose fairly within the
legitimate range or scope of the police power [without violating] any direct or
positive mandate of the constitution.”7 Essentially, the substantive due process

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972).
3 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
4 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, (1997); Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp.
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855).
5 Washington State Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wn.2d 284, 290 (2007).
6 Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 688 (2019).
7 State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 178 (2021) (citing Ragan v. City of Seattle, 58 Wn.2d 779, 783
(1961), overruled in part on other grounds).
1
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prohibits laws that intrude on “certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” no
matter how fair the legal procedures are.8
Even so, government actions that encroach on individuals’ fundamental rights
sometimes slip into state statutes. Such was the case in Washington with its law
against possession of controlled substances—a law enacted in 1971 as part of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act.9 Under this law, individuals could be convicted
with a felony, even when they didn’t know they had drugs in their possession. The
majority in the Washington State Supreme Court recently found this statute
unconstitutional in State v. Blake.10
The highest courts in a state have the final say in their decisions on
constitutional issues when they clearly signal to the United States Supreme Court
that their decision was based independently on their own state constitution.11 In
Blake, the majority stated that the decision was based on both the federal and state
constitution.12 However, Justice Gordon McCloud, writing for the majority, hinted
that the decision could have been based independently on the state’s constitution.13
By leaving the basis for its decision ambiguous, the Blake majority left the
decision susceptible to review by the United States Supreme Court. More
importantly, it missed an opportunity to rediscover and further develop due process
jurisprudence based on the state provision. Fortunately, this missed opportunity did
not foreclose the possibility of future decisions being grounded on Washington’s due
process provision.

State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321, 332 (2015); see also Yim, 192 Wn.2d at 688-89.
Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 308.
10 Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170.
11 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1041 (1983).
12 Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 195.
13 Id. at 181.
8
9
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II.

History of State Constitutional Interpretation

While the U.S. Constitution applies to each state, states are sovereign over their
own territory, and each state has created its own constitution to structure its state
government.14
There are important differences between state constitutions and the U.S.
Constitution.15 The focus of the U.S. Constitution is to structure the federal
government. Amendments were added later (the Bill of Rights) to limit the federal
government’s power against individual citizens.16 While the Federal Constitution
also places limits on states against individual citizens, those are only outer limits of
protection.17 States are allowed to further restrict and/or protect their own state
citizens as they see fit, so long as they do not directly conflict with a federal
constitutional provision.18
State constitutions are an important protection of individual rights. Both the
founders of the nation and of individual states understood that state constitutions
had an important role in the nation’s complex government.19 As a condition of
statehood after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, state candidates generally
had to create a constitution to seek admission into the Union.20 State constitutional
development was strong throughout the nineteenth century.21 By 1920, however,
states became less reliant on their constitutions and more focus on the Federal
Constitution.22
In a Harvard Law Review article in 1977, Justice Brennan encouraged states to
begin again to rely more on developing the law of their own state constitutions, even
U.S. v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, Temp. L. Rev. (1992).
16 Id. at 1171-72.
17 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 59 (1986).
18 Id. at 59.
19 Loretta H. Rush, A Constellation of Constitutions: Discovering & Embracing State Constitutions as
Guardians of Civil Liberties, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1353, 1355.
20 See e.g., Enabling Act of 1889.
21 James A. Henretta, Forward: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22 Rutgers L. J. 819,
819 (1991).
22 Id. at 836.
14
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when there was a related provision in the United States Constitution.23 But this
encouragement was tempered by the Court majority’s instructions to state courts in
Michigan v. Long.24 In this case, the majority stated it would assume state courts
were following federal law unless they clearly stated that their decisions were based
on independent state grounds.25 Therefore, if a state court analyzed its own
constitutional provision and case law, but also discussed the federal counterpart
and case law without a clear statement of the decisional basis, the case would be
reviewable by the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, state courts began to rely more on their interpretations of their
own state constitutions and use Long’s magic words to insulate their decisions from
the Supreme Court.26 In doing so, state courts took a variety of approaches.27 In the
primacy approach, courts prioritized state constitutional analysis, viewing it “as an
independent source of rights.”28 The interstitial approach was more nuanced—
courts relied on state constitutional analysis only when the state provision offered
additional or expanded rights from a parallel federal provision.29 To determine if
this was the case, courts looked at textual differences, legislative history, and other
factors before relying on independent state grounds for their decision.30 In the dual
sovereignty model, courts interpreted both constitutional provisions; the decision
would be based on state grounds while the federal constitutional analysis was
meant to aid other courts without similar state provisions, thus indirectly

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489 (1977).
24 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, (1983).
25 Id. at 1040-41.
26 Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
1025, 1025-26 (1985).
27 Id. at 1027.
28 Id. at 1028
29 Id.
30 Id.
23
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advancing federal jurisprudence.31 Finally, courts that always followed the Supreme
Court’s lead took the lock-step approach.32
Different state judges and courts took different approaches, even within the
same state. The approach changed depending on the provision and from case to
case, especially depending on the make-up of the court.
This was true in Washington. In State v. Ringer, which was decided six months
after Long, the court found that the search and seizure at issue did not violate the
Federal Constitution.33 However, when looking at Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution, the court held that the provision “pose[d] an almost
absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures, with only limited
exceptions… .”34 This view exemplified the primacy approach.
A year later, in State v. Coe, the Court based its decision on Washington’s
freedom of speech provision,35 rather than the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.36 The Court stated that its decision was based on “adequate and
independent” state grounds per Long, and gave its reasons for relying on state
grounds.37 In dual sovereignty fashion, the court found the prior restraint at issue in
the case also violated the federal provision.38 Both the dual sovereignty and primacy
approach ultimately prioritize the state constitutional interpretation.
III.

The Advent of the Gunwall Analysis

After Ringer and Coe, Washington appellate courts began to consistently
prioritize state constitution interpretation over the Federal Constitution.39 But this
Id. at 1029; State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 378 (1984).
Hugh D. Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall
is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 37 Rutgers L. J. 1169, 1175 (2006).
33 State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686 (1983).
34 Ringer, 100 Wn.2d at 690.
35 Const. art. I, § 5.
36 Coe, 101 Wn.2d at 373.
37 Id. at 373-74, 378.
38 Id. 101 Wn.2d at 378-380.
39 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 59 (1986) citing Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal
System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Puget
Sound L. Rev. 491, 499 (1984).
31
32
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practice quickly became controversial—even among individual justices on the
Washington Supreme Court.40 In order to rein in the practice, the court in Gunwall
encouraged an interstitial approach and suggested six factors courts should consider
to determine if there was a clear basis for when to ground their decisions on state
constitutional interpretation.41 Washington courts were to first rely on the federal
provision to determine if there was a violation.42 If there was no violation, then
Washington courts could use the analysis to determine if the state provision
warranted independent interpretation and if that provision provided more
protection than its federal counterpart.43
The Gunwall factors are nonexclusive and include
1. looking at the relevant text of the state constitution;
2. comparing the differences between the state and federal constitutions;
3. reviewing the state constitution and common law history;
4. examining preexisting state law;
5. considering the structural differences between the two constitutions; and
6. accounting for matters of “particular state interest or local concern” that
would outweigh the need for a national uniformity in interpretative law.44
These factors were intended to serve as both a briefing guide for litigants, as
well as a guide for state courts to make decisions based on “well founded legal
reasons” rather than relying on courts’ “notion[s] of justice.”45
After Gunwall, courts began considering independent state grounds only if the
litigant briefed all six Gunwall factors.46 The supreme court created short-cuts to
avoid conducting a redundant Gunwall analysis when non-case-specific factors had

Id. at 59-60; see also State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 583 (1990) (Guy, J., dissenting); State v.
Gocken,127 Wn.2d 95, 110 (1995) (Madsen, J., concurring); Id. at 113 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
41 Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 62-63.
42 Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 64.
43 Id. at 64-65.
44 Id. at 61-62.
45 Id. at 62-63.
46 State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472-73 (1988) (stating that the court would "not consider the
question until the issue was adequately presented and argued to [it]" using the Gunwall factors).
40
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already been decided. For example, the Boland court adopted the analysis of four of
the factors from Gunwall because both cases were interpreting the same
constitutional provision.47
The new Gunwall requirement caused controversy as seen when the majority in
Gocken based its decision on federal constitutional grounds despite previous
reliance on the state provision.48 In Gocken, the court found that the Washington
Constitution’s own double jeopardy clause did not provide broader protection to
criminal defendants than the federal double jeopardy clause.49 Both Justice Madsen
(concurring) and Justice Johnson (dissenting) disagreed with the deference to the
federal provision because Washington courts had 100 years of state constitutional
jurisprudence on double jeopardy issues.50 Justice Madsen said,
Gunwall was merely intended to be a tool in the development of a principled
analysis in cases where an issue is undecided under the state constitution.
Where this court has already determined the particular state constitutional
issue, Gunwall has no application because this court has its own preexisting
law to guide its interpretation.51
Eventually, Washington courts relied on the Washington Constitution for
provisions where it became well established that the state provision was more
protective.52 Washington provisions found to be more protective than the federal
counterpart included search and seizure, freedom of religious expression, and some
contexts of freedom of speech.53

State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 576 (1990) (adopting the first, second, third, and fifth factors
analysis as determined in Gunwall because both cases involved interpreting Const. art. I, § 7.
48 State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95 (1995).
49 Id.
50 Id. (Madsen, J., concurring); (Johnson, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 110 (Madsen, J., concurring).
52 State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769 (1998) "No Gunwall analysis is necessary in this case because
we apply established principles of state constitutional jurisprudence.”
53 Id.; City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wn.2d 633,
641 (2009) ("[W]here we have 'already determined in a particular context the appropriate state
constitutional analysis under a provision of the Washington State Constitution,' it is unnecessary
to provide a threshold Gunwall analysis.") (Citing State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, (2004));
Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wn.2d 737, 747-48 (1993) (finding the state constitution is more
protective of political speech than its federal counterpart).
47
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IV.

Gunwall and the Due Process Clause

The approach to due process remains a puzzle to the Washington Supreme
Court. This is partly because the provisions are very similar to each other. The
federal Due Process Clause says that “[n]o state shall…deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law…”54 Washington’s parallel provision
states, “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”55 But textual comparison—the second Gunwall factor—is not the only
reason for the puzzle. Rather, by not fully fleshing out the entirety of the Gunwall
analysis, the Washington Supreme Court has stymied its own development of state
due process jurisprudence.
The supreme court has conducted a Gunwall analysis for the due process clause
relatively few times.56 In 1991, the court did its first due process Gunwall analysis
in Rozner v. City of Bellevue.57 The analysis was superficial, likely because the
plaintiff failed to brief the Gunwall factors.58 The court found a state interpretation
to be unwarranted and deferred to a federal Due Process interpretation.59
The next year in State v. Ortiz, the majority did a full Gunwall analysis on
Article I, Section 3 after determining there had been no Fourteenth Amendment
violation.60 The majority quoted the Washington due process clause for the first
Gunwall factor without any further comment.61 For the second factor, the majority
remarked that the language of the two clauses was “nearly identical.”62 For the
third factor the majority found that “no legislative history ha[d] been shown which

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Wash. Const. art. I, § 3.
56 Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342 (1991); State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294 (1992); State v.
Wittenbarger, 124 Wn.2d 467 (1994); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652 (1996); King v. King, 162
Wn.2d 378 (2007); Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695 (2011); In re E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872
(2018).
57 Rozner, 116 Wn.2d 342.
58 Id. at 352.
59 Id.
60 Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d at 302.
61 Id. at 302-03.
62 Id. at 303.
54
55
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would provide a justification for interpreting the identical provisions differently.”63
Fourth, the majority found that the cases Ortiz relied on were actually based on the
Fourteenth Amendment and not on the state due process provision.64 Fifth, the
majority used the reasoning from Gunwall: that the structural differences of the
two provisions favor an independent interpretation.65 Finally, Ortiz argued state
law enforcement issues were always a local matter.66 The majority found this
reasoning unhelpful.67 In a 5-4 split, the Ortiz majority ultimately found that the
state due process provision was no more protective than the federal provision and so
the federal due process interpretation was controlling.68
Justice Charles Johnson, writing for the dissent, disagreed with the majority’s
interstitial approach and asserted that the court was “committed to deciding
questions of state constitutional law first, before addressing the federal
constitution, in order to determine if the state constitution provide[d] greater
rights.”69 The dissent referred to Justice Utter’s majority opinions in both O’Day v.
King County, an Article I, Section 5 case, (“[t]his court has a duty, where feasible, to
resolve constitutional questions first under the provisions of our own state
constitution before turning to federal law”)70 and City of Seattle v. Mesiani, an
Article I, Section 7 case (the court had a duty to “first independently interpret and
apply the Washington Constitution in order, among other concerns, to develop a
body of independent jurisprudence, and because consideration of the United States
Constitution first would be premature”).71
Additionally, the dissent did not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the
Vaster case Ortiz relied on was strictly interpreting the federal Due Process clause.

Id.
Id. at 303-04.
65 Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d at 303.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 305.
69 Id. at 318 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
70 O’Day v. King County, 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02 (1988).
71 City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456 (1988).
63
64
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Because the language in Vaster was ambiguous, the dissent said the supreme court
should have assumed the Vaster court based its analysis on the state due process
clause and found the decision controlling.72
But even without Vaster, the dissent believed the court should base its decision
on independent state grounds.73 The dissent conducted its own Gunwall analysis. It
first declared that even “identical provisions should be viewed in light of what the
language meant to the framers at the time our constitution was adopted in 1889.
They should be interpreted independently unless historical evidence shows the
framers intended otherwise.”74 The dissent concluded that because the majority
didn’t “present any historical evidence” to rely on the federal provision, the first
three factors actually favored independent state analysis.75 The dissent found
Bartholomew and Davis showed that there was preexisting state law favoring the
state provision even though those case issues did not match up completely with
Ortiz.76 And since the last two Gunwall factors favored independent analysis, the
Ortiz court could base its decision on adequate and independent state grounds.77
In subsequent cases where litigants briefed a Gunwall analysis, the court made
quick work of its own analysis and deferred to interpreting the federal provision.78
Usually, however, litigants bringing due process violation claims did not brief
Gunwall so the court would not even consider the issue on state grounds.79
In the few cases where litigants included a due process Gunwall analysis, the
courts followed a pattern: the first and second factors always favored federal
interpretation due to similar language; the third factor also favored federal

Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d at 318 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 318-19 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 319 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
75 Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 319-20 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 320 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
78 State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 679 (1996) (ruling on the other factors for similar reasons in
Ortiz and dismissing the sixth factor because it was neutral).
79 See appendix for a list of cases where the supreme court pointed out that the litigants failed to
include a Gunwall analysis in their briefs.
72
73
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interpretation due to an absence of insightful constitutional history on the subject;
and the fifth factor, despite always favoring an independent state analysis
regardless of the provision, was considered unimportant to the analysis. Courts
spent the most time considering the common law element of the third factor, the
fourth factor pertaining to preexisting state law, and the sixth factor pertaining to
state and local concerns.
A. The Common Law Element of the Third Gunwall Factor
In King v. King, a 2007 dissolution case, the majority looked at the common law
element of the third factor.80 Ms. King, the petitioner, argued that “common law
provided for a right to counsel.”81 This was important because “Washington
recognized common law principles when it became a state.”82 But the majority found
that this was only under certain circumstances and that it was not applicable in
dissolution proceedings.83 Based on this finding and the cursory analyses of the
other factors, the majority found no need for independent analysis.84
Justice Madsen, joined only by Justice Chambers, wrote an impassioned dissent.
It was clear that she was placing herself in the shoes of the indigent mother who
had lost custody of her three children to her ex-husband after representing herself
pro se in the dissolution proceedings.85 The dissent found that the majority’s
constitutional analysis was flawed—that the Washington Supreme Court had
already established that the state due process clause was more protective than the
Fourteenth Amendment in child custody cases.86
The dissent did not focus on the third element but rather the fourth—preexisting
state law. The dissent first cited In re Luscier (1974), claiming that it established a

King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378 (2007).
Id. at 392.
82 Id. at 393 (citing RCW 4.04.010).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 403-422 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 404 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
80
81
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state due process analysis. In Luscier, the court unequivocally stated that “the right
to one’s children is a ‘liberty’ protected by the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 3.87 This case predates Long and
therefore does not contain the language required by the Supreme Court to show its
decision was based on independent state grounds. This is significant because in the
Long dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the majority departed from precedent by
“presuming that adequate state grounds are not independent unless it clearly
appears otherwise.”88 Prior to Long, even when the language in an opinion was
ambiguous, the Supreme Court presumed the decision was based on independent
state grounds.89 Therefore, at the time Luscier was decided, the decision rested on
independent state ground, even if by way of default.
The dissent also referred to In re Myricks, a dependency proceeding where a
father was facing temporary loss of custody of his son.90 This case reaffirmed the
holding in Luscier by inferring that the state due process necessitated the
appointment of counsel.91
The King dissent pointed to In re Grove to show that Luscier and Myricks were,
in fact, precedent for interpreting the state due process provision.92 In Grove, the
court noted that “an indigent parent in a dependency action has a constitutional
right to counsel” based on Luscier and Myricks, but then compared the rulings from
those cases to a Supreme Court case, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
where an indigent parent only had a right to counsel in child termination
proceedings in limited circumstances.93 The King dissent asserted that due to this

In re Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 139 (1974).
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1066 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 413 (2007) (Madsen, J., dissenting); In re Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252
(1975).
91 Myricks, 85 Wn.2d at 255 (“the nature of the rights in question and the relative powers of the
antagonists, necessitate the appointment of counsel”).
92 King, 162 Wn.2d at 414 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
93 In re Grove, 127 Wn.2d 221, 229 n.6 (1995) (citing Myricks, 85 Wn.2d at 255; Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
87
88
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counterposition, Grove recognized a state due process interpretation in Luscier and
Myricks, and therefore reaffirmed that precedent.94
Finally, like the Ortiz dissent, the King dissent pointed to Bartholomew as
another example of precedent where the Washington Supreme Court based its
decision on adequate and independent state grounds when interpreting the state
due process provision.95 In that case, the court found that “the reliability of evidence
standard embodied in the state constitution’s due process clause provides broader
protection than federal due process.”96 Given these precedents, the King dissent
found that the majority’s Gunwall analysis was flawed and that the state due
process provision was definitively applicable.97
B. Fourth Factor: Preexisting State Law
The court majority turned its attention to the fourth Gunwall factor in 2011 in
Bellevue School District v. E.S.98 The respondent claimed that the relevant
Washington statute assigned a right of counsel to minors in cases regarding
involuntary commitment.99 But the court did not find the statute was adequately
related to truancy proceedings at issue in the case.100 The court reasoned that a
statute must be directly related to the issue at hand, with clear messaging from the
legislature, in order to utilize the fourth factor to establish independent state
grounds.101
Justice Chambers, the same justice who joined Justice Madsen’s dissenting
opinion in King, wrote the dissent in E.S. He was joined by Justice Sanders. The

King, 162 Wn.2d at 414 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
Id. (Madsen, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Madsen, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn. 2d 631, 639-640, 641 (1984).
97 Id. at 422 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
98 Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wash.2d 695, 711 (2011).
99 Id. at 711.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 711-12.
94
95
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dissent conducted a subtle Gunwall analysis to show that the state provision was
more protective than the federal provision in initial truancy hearings.102
First, the dissent found that there was a relevant constitutional provision that
amplified the state due process protections—this is a second Gunwall factor
consideration.103 “[B]ecause the court may order a truant child to change schools,
attend private school, or enter into alternative education programs” which may
implicate a child’s right to education, Article IX, Section 1 required additional
procedures to safeguard a child’s constitutionally protected educational interests.104
The dissent found that there was preexisting case law (fourth Gunwall factor) to
support a more protective due process law because a child’s physical liberty and
privacy interests were at stake.105 Because a truant child may potentially be held
in contempt, the dissent found that both Luscier and Myricks—cases where an
individual’s fundamental liberty interests were potentially at stake—were
applicable.106 Next, the dissent found that because a truant child may be ordered to
take a drug or alcohol test, York v. Wahkiakum School District—a state case
holding that subjecting a child to drug and alcohol testing implicated the child’s
privacy interests—was applicable.107
The dissent also found that there was statutory law (fourth Gunwall factor) to
support the claim that children need additional procedural safeguards in certain
circumstances which should extend to initial truancy proceedings.108 The dissent

Id. at 715-16 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 716 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 721. Const. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for
the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on
account of race, color, caste, or sex.”).
105 Id. at 718-21 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 718-20 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 715-16 (Chambers, J., dissenting); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297,
307 (2008).
108 Id. at 722-23 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
102
103
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reasoned that “[w]ithout the benefit of legal counsel, a child’s ability to assert her
rights is severely limited and the risk of error is high.”109
Furthermore, the dissent found that the majority’s concern in its sixth Gunwall
factor lacked evidence (that financial costs would increase if children in truancy
proceedings were entitled to counsel).110 The dissent pointed to 30 states that
provided counsel at all stages of truancy proceedings, suggesting that the extra
procedural protection was likely not especially burdensome.111
From this analysis, the dissent concluded that the Gunwall factors did support
an independent analysis of the state due process provision.112
C. Sixth Factor: Particular State Interest or Local Concern
The pattern of the Washington Supreme Court’s sixth factor analyses has
usually included a restatement of the litigant’s claim for why the issue is a matter
of local concern. Subsequently, the court has usually dismissed the claim as
irrelevant. For example, in Ortiz, Ortiz claimed that law enforcement was a local
matter so the factor should weigh in favor of state interpretation.113 But the court
simply stated that the factor did not “aid in the analysis of this particular
question.”114 In E.S., based on the respondent’s claim, the court determined that
even though Washington was very protective of a child’s right to education, that
claim was irrelevant to a student’s right to counsel in a truancy proceeding.115
D. There is potential for a different result.
Despite the supreme court’s consistent findings that an independent state
interpretation of the due process clause was unwarranted, the court has remained
open to a different finding. For example, the Tellevik court in 1992 seemed
Id. at 723 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 725-26 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 725 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 715-16, 726 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
113 State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 303 (1992).
114 Id.
115 E.S., 171 Wash.2d at 714.
109
110
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disappointed that the litigants failed to brief a Gunwall analysis.116 The court
encouraged future litigants to conduct a Gunwall analysis focusing on prior
constitutional and statutory law to see if the relevant ex parte procedure met due
process standards.117 Additionally, the King court did not conclude its Gunwall
analysis.118 Rather, it hypothetically applied a more protective due process standard
under the state constitution to consider the petitioner’s arguments.119 And finally,
more recently in In re E.H., the court based its decision on the federal interpretation
of the Due Process Clause but still conducted an analysis based on the state due
process clause.120 The E.H. court found that the Mathew’s test (from federal case
law) was sufficiently protective of a child’s right to counsel under the state due
process clause.121
V.

Another Missed Opportunity: State v. Blake

Fast forward to 2021. In Blake, the majority in the Washington Supreme Court
returned to pre-Gunwall times and explicitly based its decision on both the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Article I, Section 3 without making any reference
to Gunwall or even clarifying if the decision was based independently on state
grounds.122
The Blake defendant was convicted of possessing a controlled substance despite
her unknowing possession—a felony conviction.123 That felony conviction was based
on a statute enacted in 1971.124 The statute criminalized possession of a controlled
Tellevik v. 31641 W. Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 77 (1992).
Id. at 77.
118 King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 393 (2007).
119 Id.
120 In re E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872, 885 (2018).
121 Id. at 887.
122 State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170 (2021).
123 Id. at 175; Shannon Blake was arrested when police executed a search warrant seeking evidence
of stolen vehicles. She was on the property with the stolen vehicles at the time of the search. An
officer searched Blake and found a tiny packet of methamphetamine in the small pocket of her
jeans. Blake had gotten the jeans from a friend who had bought them secondhand. Blake was
gifted the jeans a couple days before the arrest. Blake testified that she had never used
methamphetamine and had no idea the drug was in her pocket. Her testimony was corroborated
by others.
124 Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 308.
116
117
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substance but did not contain a written mens rea element.125 While many other
states have similar statutes, those states’ courts have found an implied mens rea
element within the relevant statute, consistent with common law interpretations of
criminal law.126 Unlike other state courts, the Washington Supreme Court, in State
v. Cleppe in 1981, found that possession of a controlled substance was a strict
liability crime—one that did not require any proof of knowledge or intent as part of
the element of the crime.127 The court reinforced this holding a couple decades later
in State v. Bradshaw.128 The Bradshaw court decided that since the legislature did
not correct the statute after the court’s Cleppe decision, the Cleppe court had
correctly interpreted the statute.129 After Bradshaw, there was no attempt by the
legislature to correct the court’s interpretation.130
The Blake majority found two fundamental principles that were implicated in
the Cleppe and Bradshaw decisions: “(1) the principle that the existence of a mens
rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Angle-American
criminal jurisprudence and (2) the rule that the government cannot criminalize
essentially innocent conduct.” 131 This latter issue was a violation of an individual’s
substantive due process rights.132
The majority invalidated the statute but did not expressly overturn Cleppe and
Bradshaw.133 This decision, authored by Justice Gordon McCloud, represented a
bare majority. Justice Stephens concurred with the plaintiff’s outcome but believed
the court should have overturned Cleppe and Bradshaw instead of invalidating a

Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 175.
Id. at 196 (Stephens, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 206 (Stephens, J., concurring); State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373 (1981).
128 State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528 (2004).
129 Id. at 537.
130 Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 174.
131 Id. at 179 (internal quotations omitted).
132 Id. at 179-80.
133 Id. at 195.
125
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statute.134 The dissent, authored by Justice Johnson (and joined by Justices Madsen
and Owens), found that neither case precedent nor statute should be overturned.135
A. Constitutional Interpretation of the Due Process Clause
It is unclear whether the Blake majority’s decision was based on the federal or
state due process clause. In Michigan v. Long, the U.S. Supreme Court informed
state courts that it would find their decisions were based on federal law when their
decisions were “interwoven with the federal law.”136 Here, the Blake majority did
not declare the magic words prescribed by Long to establish that the justices were
deciding the case on independent state grounds. Nor did the Blake majority engage
in a Gunwall analysis. Therefore, it is likely that if Blake were on appeal to the
Supreme Court, it would find that the Blake decision was based on federal
constitutional law.137
At the beginning of its opinion, the Blake majority stated that “[t]he due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions, along with controlling decisions of this
court and the United States Supreme Court, compel us to conclude” that the statute
in question “exceeds the State’s police power.”138
Throughout the entire opinion, the majority referred to both the state and
federal constitutions interchangeably. By interweaving the federal case law into its
opinion, the Blake majority signaled that the decision was not based on independent
state grounds.
However, after discussing Lambert v. California and Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville 139—both Supreme Court cases—the Blake majority stated, “[o]ur state
constitution’s due process clause provides even greater protection of individual
Id. at 196 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 216-17 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
136 Michigan v. Long, 463 US 1032, 1040 (1983).
137 The statute was subsequently amended to include the word “knowingly” before “possess a
controlled substance” so the issue is likely moot. See 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 17.
138 Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 173 (emphasis added, internal footnotes omitted).
139 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972).
134
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rights in certain circumstances.”140 This is where one would expect to see a Gunwall
analysis or some other analysis underpinning the assertion of “greater protection.”
There was none.
Instead, the majority discussed City of Seattle v. Pullman,141 a 1973 Washington
Supreme Court case very similar to Lambert and Papachristou.142 In Pullman, the
majority (a 6-3 split) found that a curfew statute criminalized innocent conduct and
was therefore unconstitutional.143 The Blake majority reasoned that “this court’s
precedent also enforces the constitutional due process limit on the reach of the
State’s police power (though often without specifying the specific constitutional
source of that limit).”144
The majority failed to back up its assertion that the Washington due process
clause provided extra Article I, Section 3 protections. Furthermore, the
parenthetical in the quote above weakens that assertion. Instead of reenforcing its
decision on state grounds, the majority ended its discussion of Pullman by
reiterating that the statute violated the due process clause of the state and federal
constitutions.145
By leaving out a Gunwall analysis or any evidence of why the state due process
clause was more protective of individual rights than the federal provision, and by
referring to both due process clauses, the majority did not meet the requirement set
out by Long. Thus, the Blake decision is susceptible to review by the United States
Supreme Court.

Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 181.
City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d 794 (1973).
142 Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 181.
143 Id. at 182.
144 Id. at 181.
145 Id. at 182-83.
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VI.

A Gunwall analysis of Blake shows the state due process clause is
more protective than the Fourteenth Amendment.

If the court wanted to set a strong precedent for interpreting its own due process
clause, it could have conducted a Gunwall analysis. Washington’s due process
clause warrants independent interpretation, specifically because it is more
protective than the federal Due Process Clause.
1. The textual language of the state constitution
The state due process provision states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. “146
This provision focuses on Washington citizens’ individual procedural and
substantive due process rights. First, there is no state action requirement. No one
can interfere with Washington citizens’ life, liberty, or property interests without
procedural safeguards that prevent “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious”
actions.147 The legislature can enact laws that limit citizens’ “fundamental rights
and interests” only if those laws are directly related to a legitimate government
interest, including the well-being of its citizenry.148
The substantive element of the due process clause further limits the legislature.
There are certain fundamental rights that the state cannot interfere with, even if
there is a “procedural safeguard” in place.149
While the U.S. Constitution similarly protects the procedural due process
interests of individuals in general, there is a question as to how protective it is of
individuals’ substantive due process interests. The United States Supreme Court
recently held that only those rights referred to in the Constitution in some way or
which are “’deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” are protected by
Const. art. I, § 3.
Petstel, Inc. v. King Cnty., 77 Wash. 2d 144, 152, (1969) (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934)).
148 Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 181 (2021).
149 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land &
Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855).
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the substantive due process clause of the federal constitution.150 But the placement
and absolutism (not requiring state action) of Washington’s due process clause
suggests that it does not have the same limitations as the federal Due Process
Clause. The right to be free from overbearing police power is broadly declared and
deeply rooted in Washington history.151 To protect the erosion of substantive due
process rights, this factor should favor an independent state interpretation.
2. Significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and
state constitutions
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law….” The
only textual difference between the two clauses is that the Fourteenth Amendment
expressly contains a state action requirement, while the Washington version is
presented in passive voice. Other than this difference, the texts of the parallel
provisions are virtually the same—this is a conclusion that the Washington
Supreme Court has consistently made.152 However, Gunwall suggests that “other
relevant provisions of the state constitution may require that the state constitution
be interpreted differently” even when the parallel texts are the same.153
Article I, Section 32 presents a relevant provision: “[a] frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the
perpetuity of free government.” Interpretation of this provision is sparse in
Washington case law, but that does not preclude using it in connection with the
state’s due process clause.154

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242, (2022).
Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: Individual Rights, Free
Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WALR 669, 671 (1992).
152 In re E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872, 885 (2018); State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wn.2d 467, 480 (1994); State v.
Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 302-03 (1992).
153 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 61 (1986).
154 Westlaw Case Citing References shows that the article has only been included in 45 Washington
cases.
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The petitioner in In re Echeverria attempted to advance this line of reasoning
but the court did not fully consider the argument because the court went straight to
dismissing the merits of the petitioner’s claim.155 Therefore, there is an opportunity
for the Washington Supreme Court to consider this issue afresh.
In State v. Howell, the court recognized this provision, the fundamental
principles clause, to mean that the court was “directly charged…with a duty to be
mindful of [Washington citizens’] sovereign rights.”156 Later, the supreme court
reinforced this sentiment but also added that it “is not in any sense an inhibition on
legislative power.”157 Rather it is an “admonition” to “keep in mind the
fundamentals of our republican form of government.”158 More recently the supreme
court warned that this provision does not provide “substantive rights in and of
itself,159” but the provision is meant to be read in connection with the rights
provided in the previous thirty-one Washington Bill of Rights provisions.160 The due
process provision is the third of those provisions. Therefore, in conjunction with the
due process clause, the fundamental principles clause emphasizes the importance of
individual due process rights—both procedural and substantive.161
Because the fundamental principles clause strengthens due process protections
and there is no federal counterpart, the state due process clause both warrants an
independent state interpretation and is more protective than its federal
counterpart.
3. State constitutional and common law history
The pre-constitutional history and common law history both favor an
independent state interpretation of the due process clause.
In re Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d 323, 336 (2000) (finding the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s
right of allocution did not result in actual prejudice against the petitioner during his sentencing).
156 State v. Howell, 107 Wn. 167, 171 (1919).
157 Wheeler Sch. Dist. No. 152 v. Hawley, 18 Wn.2d 37, 48 (1943).
158 Hawley, 18 Wn.2d at 48.
159 Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d 44, 69 (1998).
160 Id. at 69.
161 Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash.2d 772, 780–81, (1991).
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a. Pre-constitutional history
While the constitutional history of the due process clause does not reveal
anything particularly useful, the idea of due process predates the U.S.
Constitution.162 In fact, it has been around for at least 800 years. 163 In the Magna
Carta, the concept was referred to as the “law of the land.”164 In 1354, the British
parliament expounded on the phrase in six newly enacted statutes and coined the
term “due process of law.”165 A few hundred years later, the terms were connected
by the famous British jurist, Sir Edward Coke.166 Colonists then brought this idea
over to the American Colonies.167
The Due Process Clause was not part of the original Constitution. It was added
later as the Fifth Amendment in 1791, but only as a limitation on the national
government.168 Much later in 1868, it was made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.169 The Fourteenth Amendment serves “as a guaranty
against any encroachment upon an acknowledged right of citizenship by the
legislatures of the States.”170
Washington, on the other hand, included its due process provision at the
beginning of its constitution upon becoming a state in 1889.171 It did this even
though the Fourteenth Amendment applied to each state in the Union. Because the
language of the federal and state provisions is similar, the Washington Supreme
Court historically has followed federal interpretation of the Due Process Clause.

B. Rosenow, Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889 § 3, at 495–96
(1962); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123–24 (1876).
163 Munn, 94 U.S. at 123–24.
164 Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366,
368 (1911).
165 The Library of Congress, Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor; Due Process of Law,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/due-process-of-law.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2022).
166 Corwin, 24 Harv. L. Rev. at 368.
167 The Library of Congress, Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor; Due Process of Law.
168 Munn, 94 U.S. at 124.
169 Id. at 124.
170 Id. at 124.
171 Washington Constitution
162
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However, since the idea of due process transcends the U.S. Constitution, unending
adherence is not warranted when considering the actual origin of the provision.
As for the constitutional history of Article I, Section 32, this provision was
proposed by George Turner, who was a proponent of natural law.172 This is the “idea
that behind every written constitution there resides an unwritten constitution,
based in part on natural rights.”173 Many of Turner’s peers shared his belief that
“constitutional interpretation often required a return to natural law principles
beyond the four corners of the constitution.”174 While a few other states have similar
provisions, Washington’s is unique in that it connects “fundamental principles with
individual rights.”175
The term “fundamental principles” was likely meant to include liberty,
democracy, natural law, and federalism.176 The federalism principle is particularly
relevant in constitutional interpretation as this leads to the conclusion that by
pairing the fundamental principles clause with the due process clause, there is a
need to interpret “the state constitution independently of the Federal
Constitution.”177
Courts should not hesitate to use the fundamental principles clause in
conjunction with the due process clause when they find that a fundamental right is
at stake. Here, the Blake majority found that unknowing drug possession was
equivalent to innocent nonconduct.178 In discussing its decision, the majority quoted
City of Seattle v. Drew stating that “[t]he right to be let alone is inviolate;
interference with that right is to be tolerated only if it is necessary to protect the
rights and the welfare of others.”179
Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: Individual Rights, Free
Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WALR 669, 673 (1992).
173 Snure 67 WALR at 673.
174 Id. at 674 (citing 32 CONG. REC. 783, 785, 789 (1899) (statements of Senator
Turner against United States imperialism in the Philippines)).
175 Id. at 676.
176 Id. at 681-89.
177 Id. at 689.
178 State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 183 (2021).
179 Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 181 (quoting City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn.2d 405,408 (1967)).
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Blake is distinguishable from other cases where the Washington Supreme Court
has declined to apply the fundamental principles clause. For example, in Seeley, the
court found that the respondent’s asserted right—to use marijuana or to choose a
particular medical treatment—was not a natural right.180 In Blake, however, the
majority found that the “right to be let alone” when one’s conduct was innocent and
passive was inviolate.181 Therefore, the fundamental principles clause can be used
to advance Washington’s due process jurisprudence.
b. Common law history
Common law history in relation to the possession of controlled substances
statute also supports an independent state analysis of the due process clause. “The
legislature has also directed the courts to look to the common law in identifying
individual rights.”182 The Washington Supreme Court has a history of reading
“mens rea elements into statutes where the legislature omitted them.”183 But since
the court faced a 40-year history of “precedent and legislative acquiescence,” the
majority found that it must overturn the controlled substances statute to meets its
common law statutory duty.184 By prioritizing common law principles which value
individual rights, the Blake court demonstrated that the common law element of the
third factor supports an independent interpretation of the due process clause.
4. Preexisting state law
Washington does, in fact, have a history of interpreting the state due process
clause. Recall in King, the dissent relied on Luscier and Myricks. Two dissents also
pointed to Bartholomew. In Bartholomew, the majority found that the state’s due
process clause was more protective regarding allowable jury instructions in capital

Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776, 812 (1997).
Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 183.
182 Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 17, (citing RCW 4.04.010).
183 State v. Anderson, 141 Wash.2d 357, 366 (2000) “(interpreting a mens rea element
into an unlawful firearm possession statute); State v. Boyer, 91 Wash.2d 342, 344
(1979) (interpreting a mens rea element into the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance
statute)”.
184 Blake, 197 Wn.2d at 174.
180
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punishment trials.185 186 Bartholomew was on remand from the United State
Supreme Court, which had instructed the Washington Supreme Court to reconsider
its previous holding in light of a subsequent case decided after the Washington
Supreme Court’s first Bartholomew decision.187 The Bartholomew II majority,
authored by Justice Pearson, based its decision on Washington’s due process clause
and declared that it was “not constrained to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the…Fourteenth Amendment[].”188 Further on, the majority said that “in
interpreting the due process clause of the state constitution, we have repeatedly
noted that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not control our interpretation of the state constitution’s due process clause.”189
More recently in State v. Vander Houwen, the petitioner claimed that he had a
due process right under the state constitution to protect his property from wildlife
damage.190 The court agreed and did not refer to the Fourteenth Amendment at
all.191 192
5. Differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions.
The Washington Supreme Court has established that “the fifth Gunwall factor
will always point toward pursuing an independent state constitutional analysis
because the federal constitution is a grant of power from the states, while the state
constitution represents a limitation of the State's power."193

State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631, 638-39 (1984).
This case was decided before the Gunwall decision in 1986.
187 Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d at 633, 639-41 (1984).
188 Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d at 639 (1984).
189 Id. at 639, (citing Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82
Wash.2d 418 (1973); Petstel, Inc. v. Cnty. of King, 77 Wash.2d 144 (1969).
190 State v. Vander Houwen, 163 Wn.2d 25, 32-33 (2008).
191 Id.
192 Here is an example where the state was not the actor depriving someone of their fundamental
rights. Rather, it was wild animals.
193 State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 105 (1995) (citing State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 180 (1994); see
also Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 713 (2011); King v. King, 162 Wash.2d 378, 393
(2007).
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6. Matters of particular interest or local concern
The framers of the Washington Constitution were meticulous in creating a
document that would prioritize the rights of state citizens and insulate them from
undue government intrusions. They crafted a unique fundamental principles clause
to further protect individual rights. Maintaining the strength of these deliberate
safeguards is an interest that far outweighs national uniformity of similarly worded
due process clauses.
7. The X-Factor
The Gunwall factors are not exclusive so Washington Courts can consider other
factors.194 The court considered an extra factor in First Covenant Church v.
Seattle.195 The goal of the Gunwall analysis, after all, was for courts to provide wellfounded legal reasons for relying on state constitutional provisions. Additionally,
the United States Supreme Court merely required that state courts clearly state
that their decisions were based on “bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds” in order to have the final say on their decision.196
The facts in Blake warrant extra considerations beyond the six Gunwall factors.
First, it is relevant that Washington was the only state at the time to criminalize
possession of a controlled substance (PCS) without any mens rea element. Second,
the statute was decades old and affected thousands of individuals’ lives, including
individuals who were incarcerated with a PCS conviction at the time of the decision.
The court had a duty to correct such a persistent error with wide-reaching

First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 120 Wn.2d 203, 208 (1992).
First Covenant Church, 120 Wn.2d at 208-10, 225-26. This case was on remand from the Supreme
Court with instructions to reconsider its previous holding in light of (then) recently decided
federal case: Smith II. The majority here based its extra factor on its finding that Smith II was
“uncertain.” The majority found that Smith II departed from a “long history of established law…”
where it “place[d] free exercise in a subordinate, instead of preferred, position.” The majority
then declared that it “rejected the idea that a political majority may control a minority’s right of
free exercise through the political process.”
196 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1033 (1983).
194
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implications. Finally, the court had an interest in protecting that decision to quickly
correct the convictions and sentences of the affected individuals.
The Washington Supreme Court had the authority to interpret Washington’s
own due process clause in Blake and to base its decision on independent state
grounds. As shown above, there was room to conduct a Gunwall analysis that
favored a state due process interpretation. Thus, the court could have established
an important precedent in finding that Washington’s due process clause was more
protective compared to its federal counterpart.
VII.

The Gunwall analysis has its own limitations.

First, when litigants fail to include a Gunwall analysis in their brief, the
supreme court typically does not consider a state constitutional analysis. This
limitation has an obvious solution: litigants should include a Gunwall analysis in
their case briefs. By briefing a Gunwall analysis in due process cases, litigants may
be able to persuade the court to finally advance Washington’s due process
jurisprudence.
Second, in many cases, the supreme court seems to look for a majority of
Gunwall factors pushing the decision in one way or the other. This is a problem
because there are an even number of factors. And while some factors are
comparative, and others are interpretive, it is not apparent how much weight
should be given to individual factors. The supreme court does not weigh in on how
to do this in any of the due process Gunwall cases.
Third, provisions with similar language to federal provisions start out
disadvantaged, despite many authorities claiming that similarity in language is not
dispositive.
Fourth, the supreme court seems to readily dismiss the fifth factor just because
it never changes and always favors an independent state interpretation. If
anything, this factor should be given more weight considering that the framers were
extra cognizant of individual rights when crafting the state constitution.
28

Additionally, the framers of the United States Constitution envisioned federalism
as being an important safeguard for citizens within their own states.
Fifth, on issues where there is no state precedent, the absence of prior case law
is self-perpetuating. But society and values change. There should be a way to set
precedent.
Sixth, reasons for prioritizing one interpretation over the other may not fit
neatly into the Gunwall factors. Prior to Gunwall, the Coe court listed five reasons
for basing its decision on independent state grounds. First Covenant had an
additional reason for choosing to interpret Washington’s own free exercise clause.
Blake had several reasons outside of the traditional Gunwall analysis for why its
decision could have been based on independent state grounds.
Finally, the Gunwall analysis is fundamentally subjective and dependent on the
composition of the court and the worldviews of the various members. In cases where
the majority conducted a Gunwall analysis and ended up on one side, dissenting
justices often conducted their own Gunwall analysis showing a different result, or
pointed out the flaws of certain factor analyses.
VIII. Conclusion
Despite the analysis’ limitations, and even when litigants fail to include the
analysis in their case briefs, courts can still use it as a starting point to advance
state due process jurisprudence. Notwithstanding, litigants can and should play an
important role to frontline Washington’s due process clause using the Gunwall
analysis.
The framers of the constitution prioritized its citizen’s individual rights not only
by placing a bill of rights at the beginning of the constitution but also through
Article I, Section 32—which reinforces the bill of rights provisions. Many courts
since the constitution’s creation have recognized such prioritization and based their
decisions regarding due process issues on independent state grounds. Therefore,
there is precedent to do so.
29

At a time when the United States Supreme Court is stripping away unwritten
substantive due process protections, it is time for the Washington Supreme Court to
rediscover Washington’s own due process jurisprudence.
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IX.

Appendix

Cases where the court pointed out
that litigants failed to brief the
Gunwall factors:

Cases where litigants briefed the
Gunwall factors and/or Court
conducted a Gunwall Analysis:

State v. Worrell, 111 Wn.2d 537 (1988)
State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419 (1989)
State v. Carver, 113 Wn.2d 591 (1989)
City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171
(1990)
State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859 (1991)
Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342
(1991)
Conard v. Univ. of Wash., 119 Wn.2d 519 (1992)
State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294 (Jun 1992)
Tellevik v. Real Prop. 120 Wn.2d 68 (Oct. 1992)
Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wn.2d
625 (1993)
State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73 (1993)
State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109 (1993)
State v. Norby, 122 Wn.2d 258 (1993)
State v. Talley, 122 Wn.2d 192 (1993)
State v. Furman, 122 Wn.2d 440 (1993)
State v. Kenyon, 123 Wn.2d 720 (1994)
State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wn.2d 467 (1994)
State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136 (1995) (The
Gunwall factors were briefed, but the court said
the claim that the state provision was more
protective had already been rejected).
State v. Myles, 127 Wn.2d 807 (1995)
State v. Fortune, 128 Wn.2d 464 (1996)
State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652 (1996)
State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736 (1996)
State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1 (1996)
In Re Boot, 130 Wn.2d 553 (1996)
State v. Blank, 131 Wn.2d 230 (1997)
State v. Valentine, 132 Wn.2d 1 (1997)
Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 133
Wn.2d 954 (1997)
State v. Lee 135 Wn.2d 369 (1998)
In re Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d 388 (1999)
In re Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d 323 (2000) (The
petitioner did a comprehensive Gunwall brief
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but the court didn’t reach the issue before
dismissing the case on the merits).
State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910 (2000)
In re Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298 2000
In re Meyer, 142 Wn.2d 608 (2001)
State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162 (2001)
In re Dyer, 143 Wn.2d 384 (2001)

In re Dyer, 143 Wn.2d 384 (2001) (The
petitioner failed to brief Gunwall but the court
did an analysis anyway to show the two
provisions were co-extensive).
State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731 (2001) (The state
briefed Gunwall but the court found it
unpersuasive. It found Bartholomew was
controlling).

State v. Wheeler, 145 Wn.2d 116 (2001)
City of Bremerton v. Widell, 146 Wn.2d 561
(2002) (The petitioners superficially briefed
Gunwall, but the court found the argument
unpersuasive).
City of Sumner v. Walsh, 148 Wn.2d 490 (2003)
Anderson v. King Cnty., 158 Wn.2d 1 (2006)
King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378 (2007)
Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695
(2011)
Hardee v. State Dep’t of Health, 172 Wn.2d 1
(2011)
In re Rhome, 172 Wn.2d 654 (2011) (The
petitioner briefed Gunwall but the court found
it was unpersuasive).
State v. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d 1 (2011)
In re Dependency of M.S.R, 174 Wn.2d 1 (2012)
State v. Jordan, 180 Wn.2d 456 (2014)
LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., 181
Wn.2d 48 (2014)
State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321 (2015)
In re E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872 (2018)
Fields v. Dep’t of Early Learning, 193 Wn.2d 36
(2019)
Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682 (2019)
Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. v. City of
Federal Way, 195 Wn.2d 742 (2020)
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